with "high confidence" that the [nuclear warhead development] program halted in 2003
Most of the controversy surrounding this has to do with when Mr. Bush knew the conclusions of the report (same reference as above). This is probably not the important issue. The issue is what project should the US pay attention to, the weapons program, or the enrichment program. These are not entirely separate. The enrichment program is more important, and it deemed the rate limiting step by the intelligence community.(http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_11/Albright.asp)
But let me start at the beginning. I do not believe that Iran should have nuclear weapons. However, Iran's remaining nuclear program is legal under international law. How do I know this? Because the US sold it to them. (http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/013007E.shtml)
Such dreams were energized by a bold new American experiment called Atoms for Peace. Unveiled by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1953, the program promised to share some U.S. nuclear technology with foreign nations that vowed to forgo atomic weapons.
...
U.S. reactors, for instance, went to Iran, Pakistan and Colombia
One of the main reasons Iran reacts poorly when the US tries to shut down their nuclear program was because it was sold to them by the US. Because of our history supplying this regime, we need to stop trying to stop them entirely. There is a compromise position, allow Iran to have its program but without enrichment capability.
Without highly enriched weapons grade uranium, Iran cannot build a weapon. This statement is obvious, but how enriched is Iran's uranium? (http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_11/Albright.asp)
The August IAEA report does not state how much LEU Iran has produced, only that the IAEA has verified enrichment to levels up to 3.7 percent, though Iran has claimed enrichment up to 4.8 percent.
Iran is using its nuclear program as a source of national pride(http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/29/international/middleeast/29nuke.html), so if anything Iran is reporting a higher value than is generally available, explaining the discrepancy between the inspectors value and the value that Iran claims.
How enriched does Iran's uranium need to be for it to be used in a reactor or to make a bomb? Low enriched uranium is used in reactors, weapons grade is used in weapons.(http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_11/Albright.asp)
LEU fuel typically has less than a five percent uranium-235 concentration, while weapons-grade uranium has more than 90 percent of the uranium-235 isotope
So, right now Irans Uranium is squarely withing the fuel uranium regime. There is still time to deal with this issue.
The timeline given in and conclusion of the this report:
The U.S. intelligence community has given the date as no sooner than 2010 but before 2015, and a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) reportedly contains the same projected estimate...
Iran has not yet therefore demonstrated competency at enriching uranium, though it is clearly on the road toward doing so.
What we need to be addressing is Iran's uranium enrichment program because this is one of the most critical steps for making a weapon. In early August, President Bush changed his dialogue about Iran to reflect this, though it may have had to do with the impending NIE. (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3036677/)
Russia's plan to supply Iran with uranium could be the solution: (http://www.kommersant.com/p832102/Iran_Nuclear_UN_Russia/)
Russia has recently allowed experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to Novosibirsk Plant Chemical Concentrates which is the storage site for nuclear fuel for the first block of the Bushehr nuclear power station. As soon as inspectors seal the barrels with the fuel it will be ready to be shipped to Iran.
If Russia supplies Iran with Uranium, then the international community, including both the US and Russia, can pressure Iran to halt its enrichment program entirely. Because the transferred uranium is monitored by the IAEA, Iran could be effectively stopped from having the capacity for creating weapons. The US needs to come to the table, without preconditions, to make such a plan work. They have been unwilling to do so. (http://www.nysun.com/article/43433) Iran will not stop its current program to come to the table because (at a minimum) national pride prevents it (http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/29/international/middleeast/29nuke.html). The US should take the high road and come to the table without the demanded preconditions. This is the quickest way for us to stop WWIII.
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